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CASE DIGEST

This CASE DIGEST provides brief analyses of cases that represent current aspects of international law. The Digest includes cases establishing
legal principles, as well as those applying established legal principles to
new factual situations. The cases are grouped in topical categories, and
references are given for further research.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ..............................
II. CIVIL RIGHTS ......................................
III. AIR CARRIER LIABILITY .............................
I.

625
628
630

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

THE DETENTION AND TORTURE OF A UNITED STATES CITIZEN BY
FOREIGN

GOVERNMENT

DURING

THE COURSE

OF HIS

CRUITED AND HIRED IN THE UNITED STATES TO SERVE

JOB, RE-

As A

FOR-

EIGN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE, CONSTITUTES ACTION BASED UPON
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY CARRIED ON IN THE UNITED STATES BY A
FOREIGN STATE FOR WHICH THE FOREIGN GOVERNMENT IS NOT IMMUNE UNDER THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ACT,

Nelson v.

Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1991).
In 1983, Scott Nelson started work as a monitoring systems engineer
for the King Faisal Specialist Hospital (Hospital) in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Hospital Corporation of America (HCA), an independent corporation under contract to recruit employees for the Hospital, conducted the
recruitment. After an interview in Saudi Arabia, Nelson returned to
Miami, Florida, entered into an employment contract in November 1983
and commenced working at the Hospital the following month. Nelson
alleged that in the course of performing his duties under his employment
contract with the Hospital, agents of the Saudi government detained and
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tortured him in Saudi Arabia in retaliation for reporting safety violations
at the Hospital. He further alleged that, during his detention, officials of
the Saudi government sexually assaulted his wife.
Nelson and his wife, Vivian, brought suit against Saudi Arabia, the
Hospital, and Royspec, a corporation owned and controlled by the government of Saudi Arabia. The plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages under sixteen counts and asserted subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976 (FSIA). Saudi
Arabia moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss and concluded that Nelson's claims were not based upon the commercial activities of Saudi Arabia in the United States. It reasoned that the link between the
recruitment activities and the defendants failed to establish substantial
contact with the United States within the meaning of Title 28 United
States Code section 1603(e). Additionally, the district court could find no
nexus between these activities and Nelson's complaint.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Held:
Reversed. Nelson's recruitment and hiring in the United States was part
of a process having substantial contact with the United States because
the recruitment was conducted by HCA, an agent of Saudi Arabia, in
the United States.
The court distinguished Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp.,
621 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1980), in which the Fifth Circuit dismissed the
appeal, because, under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the order granting the defendant's motion to dismiss was not a
final order. According to the appeals court in Arango, the district court
would have had subject matter jurisdiction over these claims under section 1605(a)(2). Furthermore, unlike the situation in Arango, the defendant's actions resulted from and were attributable directly to the
plaintiff's employment.
The court also distinguished Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 237 (1989), in which a Soviet newspaper published an article to enable agencies of the Soviet government to
avoid their contractual obligations to the plaintiff. The court rejected
plaintiff's contention that the libel was commercial activity because the
activities at issue were essentially public and governmental in nature.
The activities alleged in the present case, on the other hand, were clearly
commercial in nature because they were so intertwined with Nelson's
employment at the Hospital that they were based upon his recruitment
in the United States.
The holding in the instant case was not based upon the act of state
doctrine, but on the interpretation and application of the FSIA. Signifi-

1991]

CASE DIGEST

cance-The Eleventh Circuit has expanded the interpretation of the
commercial activity exception of the FSIA to include police activities by
foreign governments in their own state that are intertwined with commercial activities in the United States.
INTRODUCTION

OF

NEGOTIABLE

PROMISSORY

NOTES

INTO

THE

UNITED STATES BY FOREIGN STATES FOR PURPOSES OF RAISING CAPITAL

CONSTITUTES

COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY

HAVING

SUBSTANTIAL

CONTACT WITH THE UNITED STATES BARRING THE FOREIGN STATE'S
RIGHT TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia, 930

F.2d 1013 (2nd Cir. 1991).
In September 1981, International Promotion and Ventures, Ltd.
(IPVL), a Delaware Corporation with its principal place of business in
New York, entered into a contract with the Bolivian Air Force. Under
the contract, IPVL agreed to sell Bolivia a number of fighter jets and
related equipment and services in exchange for negotiable promissory
notes guaranteed by the Central Bank of Bolivia. In December 1981,
pursuant to the contract, Bolivia issued a series of negotiable promissory
notes (Notes), numbered 1 through 40, with a face value of nearly
eighty-one million dollars. Notes 11 through 40 were issued to IPVL.
IPVL received some of these Notes in Bolivia, while others, including
Note 12, were sent directly to the United States. Because the United
States State Department refused to issue the necessary transfer license,
however, the aircrafts remained undelivered. Bolivia brought suit in the
Southern District of New York against IPVL, its sole shareholder, and
its president, Bernard L. Tractman. By June 1986, however, both defendants had filed petitions for bankruptcy. Consequently, the bankruptcy court denied Bolivia's application to recover the outstanding
Notes.
In December 1986, plaintiff David Shapiro filed this action against
Bolivia, the Bolivian Air Force, and the Central Bank of Bolivia, to recover the face value of Note 12, which he allegedly possessed. Shapiro
was a citizen of the United States who resided primarily in Hong Kong,
but who also maintained a residence in New York City. Before discovery, defendants-appellees, who denied any knowledge regarding how
Shapiro had acquired Note 12, moved to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds that the district court lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction and on the ground of forum non conveniens. The district court
granted the motion to dismiss and held that appellees had neither waived
their immunity pursuant to Title 28 United States Code section
1605(a)(1) by initiating the previous proceedings, nor engaged in the
commercial activity carried on in the United States that would subject
them to jurisdiction under section 1605(a)(2).
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Held: Reversed. While the appellees did not waive their sovereign immunity pursuant to section 1605(a)(1), they have carried on commercial activity sufficiently related to the United States to subject them to jurisdiction under
section 1605(a)(2).
Because Shapiro's claim was for payment of Note 12, the overall activity giving rise to his claim was the issuance of the Notes to IPVL. The
activity in question was clearly the issuance of negotiable promissory
notes later brought into the United States for the purpose of raising capital. The issuance of public debt is a commercial activity within the
meaning of section 1605(a)(2). The court found the substantial contact
standard of due process satisfied in the present case by appellees' commercial activities. Accordingly, the court found the commercial activity
exception of the FSIA satisfied.
The instant court cited Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Nigeria,
647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982), as
authority for equating personal jurisdiction over foreign states to subject
matter jurisdiction plus valid service of process. Additionally, the court
could find no unusual inconvenience to appellees in litigating this matter
in the United States. According to the court, satisfaction of the substantial contact requirement and the strong United States interest in capital
transactions by foreign sovereigns conducted through United States intermediaries justifies the exercise of personal jurisdiction in the United
States under section 1330(b). Significance-The Second Circuit helped
solidify judicial interpretation of the "commercial transaction" and "substantial contact" clauses relating to the FSIA.
II.
TITLE

CIVIL RIGHTS

VII DoES NOT APPLY EXTRATERRITORIALLY TO REGULATE

EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES OF UNITED STATES EMPLOYERS WHO EM-

PLOY UNITED STATES CITIZENS ABROAD,

E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Ameri-

can Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
The Petitioner, Boureslan, a naturalized citizen of the United States
born in Lebanon and working in Saudi Arabia, was discharged by his
employer, respondent Arabian American Oil Company, a Delaware corporation. Boureslan initially filed a charge against the respondent and its
subsidiary Aramco Service company with petitioner Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). He later instituted this action in the
district court, seeking relief under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
for discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin. The district court granted respondents' motion to dismiss for lack of subject mat-
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ter jurisdiction on the grounds that Title VII's protection does not extend
to United States citizens employed abroad by United States employers.
On appeal, a panel for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
After granting both parties' petitions for certiorari, the Supreme Court
of the United States Held: Affirmed. Title VII does not apply extraterritorially to regulate employment practices of United States employers
who hire United States citizens abroad. The Court upheld as a longstanding United States tradition the principle that, unless contrary intent
exists, congressional legislation applies only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. The Court refused to apply to Title VII the
broad jurisdictional language usually extended to acts regulating
commerce.
Petitioners argued unsuccessfully that Title VII's "alien exemption"
clause-which renders the statute inapplicable to an employer with respect to the employment of aliens outside any State-clearly manifests
the necessary congressional intent to cover employers of United States
citizens working abroad. Petitioners cited as authority for this assertion
Espinoza v. FarahMfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973). The Court responded
that if petitioners' argument were correct, there would be no statutory
basis for distinguishing United States employers from their foreign counterparts. The Court fortified its position by citing factors that suggested a
purely domestic focus for Title VII, including congressional intent not to
interfere with the sovereignty and laws of foreign states. It also cited the
lack of provisions addressing conflicts of law that inevitably arises from
legislation that extended abroad.
The Court similarly refused to defer to the EEOC's position that Title
VII should be applied abroad because the interpretation presented was
neither contemporaneous with Title VII's enactment, nor consistent with
an earlier, contrary position taken by the EEOC closer to the date the
statute came into law. The Court was unwilling, absent clear evidence of
congressional intent, to prescribe a policy that would raise difficult international legal questions by imposing employment discrimination policies
of this state upon United States corporations operating abroad. Finally,
the Court pointed to the numerous occasions on which Congress extended legislation extraterritorially. This, in the Court's view, was clear
evidence of congressional awareness of the need to use clear language in
this area.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall recognized as a canon of
construction the need to apply congressional acts only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States unless a contrary intent is apparent
in the legislation. He refused, however, to accept this canon as a clear
statement of the law, the application of which would relieve courts of the
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duty to apply all available evidence of legislative intent. Justice Marshall
rejected the arguments presented by the majority regarding the "alien
exemption" clause. In his view, the history of the clause suggests congressional intent to apply Title VII extraterritorially. Furthermore, the
"(alien exemption" clause is an example of congressional concern for the
issue of conflicts of law.
Significance-This case permits United States corporations to deal
with United States citizens employed abroad without concern for the
constraints of Title VII.
III.

AIR CARRIER LIABILITY

PUNITIVE DAMAGES NOT RECOVERABLE IN ACTIONS GOVERNED BY
WARSAW CONVENTION FOR AIR CARRIER'S WILLFUL MISCONDUCT,

In re Air Disaster At Lockerbie, Scotland, 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir.
1991).
Two parallel cases involving similar factual conditions and a single
legal question reached the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The
first dealt with the crash of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland.
The second dealt with a hijacking in Karachi, Pakistan. In both cases,
the surviving relatives and personal representatives of those who died
sued Pan American World Airways, Inc. (Pan Am), two of its subsidiaries, and its parent corporation. All parties agreed that the Warsaw Convention (the Convention) and the Montreal Accord governed the cases.
In both cases, Pan Am moved for partial summary judgment on the punitive claims, asserting that the Warsaw Convention barred the recovery
of punitive damages. In the Lockerbie case, the district court granted
partial summary judgment and dismissed the punitive damages claims.
Rein v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 547
(E.D.N.Y. 1989). In the Karachi case, the district court denied Pan
Am's motion for partial summary judgment. Joshi v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
Both cases reached the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
which the court Held: Affirmed Lockerbie Case and reversed Karachi
Case. Because the purposes for the Warsaw Convention are inconsistent
with an award of punitive damages, this remedy is not recoverable in
actions governed by the Warsaw Convention.
The court initially concluded that the Warsaw Convention pre-empts
state causes of action because state laws differ substantially as to the
nature and use of punitive damages. Therefore, the award of punitive
damages would result in great confusion and would destroy any hope of
uniformity in applying the Convention. The court cited Boehringer-
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Manheim Diagnostics,Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 737
F.2d 456 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1186 (1985), as authority
establishing the exclusivity of causes of action arising under the Convention. Similarly, the court alluded to In re Air Crash Disaster at Gander,
Newfoundland on Dec. 12, 1985, 684 F. Supp. 927 (W.D. Ky. 1987),
in which the district court held that "state law claims for punitive damages are pre-empted by the Convention to the extent that they would
prevent the application of the Convention's limitations."
The court then discussed its interpretation of article 17 of the Convention, using the laws of the states instrumental in drafting the Convention
to support its interpretation of that article. In all the examples cited, the
court noted the lack or rarity of punitive damages awarded for purposes
of punishing the defendants. Based on the context in which the article
was written, the law of the contracting parties, subsequent interpretations, and the historical translations, the court concluded that article 17
has limited the liability of air carriers to recovery of compensatory damages only.
The court agreed that the Convention leaves the measures of damages
to the internal law of parties to the Convention. None of the authorities
cited by the plaintiffs, however, seem to have considered whether the
type of compensatory damages left to local law could include punitive
damages. According to the court, the drafting history of article 24 indicates that the article focused primarily on issues of descent and distribution. The court found no evidence that the drafters intended to allow a
contracting party to impose punitive damages.
With regard to willful misconduct and the application of article 25,
the court still could find no evidence to support the distribution of punitive damages, even after eliminating the liability limit in article 17. Since
civil law would not view article 17 as a limit on liability, it was unreasonable, in the court's view, to impose a purely common law notion on a
Convention drafted primarily by civil lawyers. Finally, the court noted
several policy considerations, including: (i) the need to maintain uniformity in application and interpretation of the Convention; (ii) the need
to preserve carriers' ability to insure against losses; and (iii) the need to
reduce the number of cases litigated and the amount of time needed to
award damages in the remaining cases. Significance-The Court of Appeals seems to have resolved in favor of the air carriers an apparent split
in the district courts regarding whether punitive damages may be recovered under the Warsaw Convention.
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MENTAL INJURIES,
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BARS RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR PURELY

Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd,

U.S.

-,

111 S. Ct. 1489 (1991).
In 1983, an Eastern Airline flight between Miami and the Bahamas
averted a crash into the Atlantic Ocean after its engines lost oil pressure.
Respondent passengers brought separate suits, later consolidated into one
proceeding, to recover damages solely for mental distress arising out of
the incident. Eastern alleged that the engine failure and subsequent
preparations for emergency landing amounted to an accident under article 17 of the Convention, which prohibits recovery of damages for mental
distress without any physical injuries. The district court cited the previous interpretations of the text of article 17 in Burnett v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.M. 1973), in concluding that
article 17 does not encompass recovery for purely mental distress. The
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that its interpretation of the phrase "Lsion corporelle" in the authentic French
text of article 17 allowed plaintiff to recover damages for mental anguish
alone.
The United States Supreme Court Held: Reversed. The term "Lesion
corporelle" as used in article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, which sets
forth the conditions under which international air carriers can be held
liable for injuries to passengers, means "bodily injury." Based on this
translation, article 17 would prohibit an award for purely psychic injuries. As observed by the Court, neither the Warsaw Convention, nor any
of the applicable legal sources, suggests that the phrase "Lsion
corporelle," as used in article 17, should be translated other than as
"bodily injury." Furthermore, a review of relevant French legal materials revealed no legislation, judicial decision, or scholarly writing indicating that the original drafters in 1929 envisioned recovery for psychic injuries. Finally, the Court emphasized the negotiating history of the
Convention and documentary records of the Warsaw Conference as support for its narrow interpretation of article 17.
According to the instant Court, a narrow interpretation of article 17
also was consistent with the primary purpose of the Convention: the
need to limit the liability of air carriers in order to foster the growth of
the fledgling commercial aviation industry. By denying recovery for
purely emotional harm, the Court hoped to strike a balance between the
need for airline passengers to be compensated for their injuries and the
need of air carriers to operate without fear of excessive liability. Significance-The Supreme Court has resolved a dispute in the lower courts
regarding recovery for purely mental anguish and continues to limit the
liability of air carriers under the Convention.

